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    The Firm and Market Structures

    1 / 25

    The firm and market structures

    In this deck:

    1. When a firm should keep producing, and when it should shut down
    2. How plant size changes average cost
    3. How the four market structures set price and output, and how to measure concentration

    Short run, long run and the two key points

    In the short run, some inputs are fixed (usually the plant), so fixed costs must be paid even at zero output. In the long run, every cost is variable.

    • Breakeven point: average revenue (AR) = average total cost (ATC). Total revenue (TR) = total cost (TC), so economic profit is zero.
    • Shutdown point: AR = average variable cost (AVC). Below it, producing loses more than the fixed costs.

    For a price taker, AR is simply the market price.

    The running example

    A paper mill is a price taker. At its current output of 100,000 units a year:

    ItemTotal (USD)Per unit (USD)
    Fixed cost (TFC)300,0003
    Variable cost (TVC)500,0005 (AVC)
    Total cost (TC)800,0008 (ATC)
    ATC=TCQAVC=TVCQATC = \frac{TC}{Q} \qquad AVC = \frac{TVC}{Q}

    So the breakeven price is USD 8 and the shutdown price is USD 5. Output is held at 100,000 units to keep the example simple.

    Three prices, three decisions

    If the mill shuts down, it still pays the fixed cost: a loss of USD 300,000. Compare that with operating. Move the price:

    TR (USD thousands)600
    Profit if it operates (USD thousands)-200
    Profit if it shuts down (USD thousands)-300
    Operating beats shutting down by100
    • USD 9: profit of 100,000. Operate.
    • USD 6: loss of 200,000, smaller than 300,000. Operate for now.
    • USD 4: loss of 400,000. Shut down.

    The decision rules

    Revenue testShort runLong run
    AR ≥ ATC (TR ≥ TC)OperateStay
    AVC ≤ AR < ATCOperateExit
    AR < AVC (TR < TVC)Shut downExit

    A firm facing a downward-sloping demand curve (a price searcher) has marginal revenue below price, so use the total form: TR versus TC and TVC.

    Check yourself

    A firm makes 50,000 units. Fixed costs are USD 200,000, variable costs USD 350,000, and the price is USD 8. It expects this to persist. It should:

    Plant size and average cost

    In the long run a firm can pick its plant size. The long-run average total cost (LRATC) curve shows the lowest ATC for each scale. It is usually U-shaped:

    Lowest ATC by plant size (illustrative)

    Plant 114USD
    Plant 211USD
    Plant 39USD
    Plant 49USD
    Plant 510USD
    Plant 612USD
    • Falling: economies of scale (increasing returns to scale)
    • Flat: constant returns to scale
    • Rising: diseconomies of scale

    Why costs fall, then rise

    Economies of scale come from labour specialisation, mass production, better equipment and bulk discounts on inputs.

    Diseconomies of scale come from bureaucracy, a harder-to-motivate workforce and less innovation.

    The lowest point on the LRATC curve is the minimum efficient scale. Under perfect competition, firms must produce there in long-run equilibrium, where price equals minimum LRATC and economic profit is zero.

    Check yourself

    A cement maker doubles its plant size, and its minimum average total cost falls from USD 4,000 to USD 3,500 per tonne. The firm is experiencing:

    Four market structures

    Five factors place a market on the spectrum: the number and size of firms, product differentiation, pricing power, barriers to entry and exit, and non-price competition.

    SellersMany
    ProductIdentical
    BarriersVery low
    Pricing powerNone

    Each firm faces a horizontal (perfectly elastic) demand curve at the market price, such as wheat in a region.

    Every firm sets MR = MC

    A firm maximises profit where marginal revenue (MR) = marginal cost (MC).

    • Under perfect competition, demand is horizontal, so MR = price.
    • In the other three structures, demand slopes down. To sell one more unit the firm lowers its price on every unit, so MR < price.

    The firm picks the quantity where MR = MC, then charges the highest price the demand curve allows for that quantity.

    MR = MC, worked

    A toothpaste brand has MC of USD 4 per unit (units in thousands):

    QPriceTRMR of last unit
    61484–
    713917
    812965
    911993
    • Going from 7 to 8: MR 5 > MC 4, so produce it.
    • Going from 8 to 9: MR 3 < MC 4, so stop.

    Optimal output is 8, at a price of USD 12. Price is above MR and MC.

    Monopolistic competition: short run versus long run

    OutputMR = MC
    Price vs ATCP > ATC
    Economic profitPositive

    Profits attract new firms, because barriers to entry are low.

    Compared with perfect competition, price is higher and output lower. ATC isn't at its minimum, so firms carry excess capacity. The trade-off is product variety.

    Check yourself

    In long-run equilibrium, a firm in monopolistic competition most likely:

    Oligopoly: the kinked demand curve

    In an oligopoly, firms are interdependent. The kinked demand curve model assumes rivals ignore a price rise but match a price cut.

    • Above the current price, demand is elastic: raise the price and you lose share.
    • Below it, demand is less elastic: cut the price and rivals follow.

    The kink creates a gap in the MR curve. If MC passes through the gap, the kink price stays optimal even when MC shifts a little.

    Check yourself

    An oligopolist believes rivals will match its price cuts but not its price rises. Its MC rises slightly but still passes through the gap in its MR curve. It will most likely:

    Three more oligopoly models

    Two firms with identical MC each assume the other won't change. In long-run equilibrium they split the market equally. Price is below the monopoly price but above the competitive price, and moves toward it as firms are added.

    Nash equilibrium

    A Nash equilibrium is reached when no firm can do better by changing its choice alone, given what the others do. Two firms choose a high or low price (profits in USD thousands):

    ProfitsB highB low
    A highA 800, B 500A 550, B 600
    A lowA 500, B 300A 450, B 400
    • A does better with a high price whatever B does.
    • Given A high, B prefers low (600 > 500).

    Nash equilibrium: A high, B low. Joint profit is 1,150.

    Collusion beats the Nash outcome

    Both charging high earns the most jointly: 800 + 500 = 1,300. If A pays B 150 to price high, A keeps 650 and B gets 650. Both beat their Nash profits of 550 and 600.

    Collusion like this is illegal in many countries. A cartel such as OPEC breaks down when members cheat. Collusion lasts longer with fewer firms, similar products and costs, small frequent purchases, sure and severe retaliation, and little outside competition.

    Measuring concentration

    Measuring the elasticity of a firm's demand directly is hard, so regulators use market shares instead.

    The N-firm concentration ratio adds the market shares of the N largest firms:

    CRN=s1+s2+⋯+sNCR_N = s_1 + s_2 + \dots + s_N

    The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) adds their squared shares:

    HHI=∑i=1Nsi2HHI = \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2
    • sis_i: market share of firm i, as a decimal

    A merger: CR versus HHI

    Shares are 30%, 20%, 15%, 10%, then five firms at 5%. The two largest merge:

    Top four30, 20, 15, 10
    4-firm CR75%
    4-firm HHI0.1625

    HHI = 0.09 + 0.04 + 0.0225 + 0.01 = 0.1625

    The ratio barely moves. Squaring weights large firms heavily, so the HHI jumps.

    Identifying the structure, and the limits

    To place a firm, look at the number of firms, barriers to entry, how close the substitutes are, and how firms compete.

    Concentration measures help, but:

    • Neither measures market power or elasticity of demand directly.
    • Neither considers barriers to entry. A firm with a large share may have little pricing power if new firms could enter easily.
    • The concentration ratio is insensitive to mergers among the largest firms.

    Check yourself

    Four firms hold 40%, 30%, 20% and 10% of a market. The 4-firm HHI is closest to:

    Remember this

    • Short run: operate if AR ≥ AVC. Long run: stay only if AR ≥ ATC.
    • LRATC falls with economies of scale and rises with diseconomies.
    • All firms set MR = MC. Outside perfect competition, P > MR.
    • Monopolistic competition: zero long-run economic profit, excess capacity.
    • Oligopoly: interdependence; kinked demand, Cournot, Stackelberg, dominant firm, Nash.
    • HHI reacts to mergers more than the concentration ratio; neither sees barriers to entry.

    That's the reading.

    Now test it on exam-style questions while it's fresh.